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1 Introduction
When a county descends into violent domestic
conflict, obviously its security is challenged. But
the threat is not only to the security of the state
or even to the physical protection of its citizens
from violent aggression. As long ago as the English
Civil War philosophers recognised that conflicts
and other human acts that lead to a significant
diminishment in other aspects of a community’s
wellbeing also shorten lives and thus are dangers
to human security as well (Hobbes 1939 [1651]).
Thus the threats and conflicts to be considered
include not only violence itself but also ones to the
resources and livelihoods on which communities
are dependent. In the communities most affected
by the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), Mozambique,1 Sierra Leone
and Somalia modern medicine disappeared, the
future livelihoods of young people were
diminished when their education was disrupted,
and malnutrition increased, such that in Sierra
Leone, for example, children even died from a
lack of salt (Leonard and Samantar 2011; Mushi
2012; Vincent 2012). These casualties of war are
as fatal as the more obvious wounds produced by
bullets and cutlasses. Even though Thomas
Hobbes did not feel a government owed its
citizens prosperity or justice, he did feel that a
state that could not protect its subjects from life-
threatening insecurities such as these had no
right to expect their obedience.
All governance is co-produced. Even if the law
assigns sovereignty and suzerainty to one actor,
that law is but one of the multiple resources that
are needed for effective rule. And different actors
possess those varied resources and supply them
with greater or lesser degrees of compliance. For
example, it matters whether taxes are paid
willingly or evaded (Liebermann 2003). And even
the lowliest workers may provide their labour
enthusiastically or reluctantly (Barnard 1968
[1938]). Thus the effectiveness of all governments
relies upon numerous actors at multiple levels
within and beyond the state, connected to one
another and the various functions of governance
through complex and divergent networks
(De Herdt 2011).
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If all governance systems are multilevel and
networked to some degree, this reality is even
more pronounced for countries that are
emerging from prolonged periods of civil
violence. In this research we have been
concerned with the subset of conflict and post-
conflict countries located in Tropical Africa. And
scholars have long remarked on the unusually
large gap between what they have called
‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ sovereignty in parts of
that region; the international system grants the
privileges of statehood (including international
legal recognition and the last word over
development assistance) to many countries that
in fact are unable to exercise the monopoly over
their full territory of the legitimate exercise of
force that the concept of statehood requires
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Katzenstein 1996;
Weber 1947). 
When a conflict or post-conflict country is unable
to exercise ‘empirical sovereignty’, no one
institution or even set of institutions is in charge.
Authority is negotiated in complex and fluid sets
of relationships between institutions that range
from peasant villages to the metropoles of the
industrial world. Whether or not the erosion of
sovereignty in Africa is judged to be good or bad,
it is a practical reality and must feature
prominently in any attempts to understand and
improve conflict management on the continent.
The question therefore is not whether or not a
particular type of sovereignty should exist but
what new concepts can be proposed to better fit
the current situation and improve it. Networks
are one of those concepts.
The networks governing a country gripped in
conflict or recently emerging from it will include
not only its national government and its key
economic and military actors but also other
countries, international organisations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and local
level systems of governance. The former,
national set of actors will have lost power and
coherence, sometimes to the extent of
threatening the collapse of the state itself, which
opens the way for a much more significant role
for the latter set. In this era of United Nations
and regional peacekeeping missions and of
bilateral and multilateral development
assistance, the impact of internationals is widely
acknowledged. In addition, however, a key
finding of recent research (including our own) is
that local-level systems of governance (including
churches) generally are the key building blocks
of social order in a post-conflict situation – for
they usually were the only units managing and
resolving disputes during the conflict period
(Manor 2007; Bastian and Luckham 2003).
Neither the diffusion of core responsibilities in
conflict states to both local and transnational
non-state actors nor attempts to build state
capacity directly are likely to slow or halt;
neither are the fundamental tensions between
the two trends likely to dissipate. As such, we
must attempt to understand the implications of
networked governance for institution-building in
weak and fragile states. 
We start by using social contract theory to look
at the local-level building blocks for the
reconstruction of social order and then turn to an
examination of the changes and operation of the
other networks engaged in governance. 
2 Local governance and the social contract
Local governance structures most often have
undergone considerable change during the
conflict – for example, inequalities become larger,
patronage more prominent, and the influence of
the ‘purveyors of violence’ greater (Leonard and
Samantar 2011). Thus the ‘building blocks for
peace’ are not reflected accurately any longer in
the classical anthropology texts on the social
systems in question. A correct understanding of
the evolution of these ‘primary’ governance
systems under conflict and what can be expected
of them subsequently is fundamental to the
success of efforts to create peace and rebuild
general social order.
African states that have collapsed into prolonged
violent conflict severely test the ways of thinking
used by those who want to help restore their
populations to security. Those who populate the
international organisations and donor agencies
who come forward to provide assistance have
never lived for long themselves in such
conditions – certainly they didn’t keep their
families with them. And the same is true of the
academics and consultants who advise them. The
instinctive response of internationals is to
recreate the state as it has existed in Europe
since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The
international community has helped to prevent
the complete collapse of some states, but without
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necessarily creating durable conditions for the
efficient performance of the whole political
system. It sometimes has helped some regimes
extend their control over large territories but
frequently has not yet succeeded in stabilising
the various internal systems of governance that
really sustain the state. Thus, on the basis of this
project’s fieldwork in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire,
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the former
Somalia, we submit that the international
community is struggling with inadequate
conceptual tools.
Generally when Westerners confront collapsed
states in Africa, Thomas Hobbes and the social
contract are in the background. They presuppose
that the structures of the central state must be
restored in the first stages of any solution, for, as
Hobbes had it, life without it is ‘nasty, brutish
and short’ (Hobbes 1939 [1651]).2 Also, they
implicitly assume that the state must have failed3
because the social contract it had with its
citizens has been broken and that the recreation
of order will require its restoration (multiple
conversations with donor staff; OCDE 2008).
Neither of these assumptions is wholly without
merit. But we will show that they need to be
reformulated to meet the conditions of
contemporary post-conflict Africa. First, Hobbes
was right that states are capable of providing the
highest levels of human security and that in their
absence predatory violence by competing armed
groups is likely. But some states themselves
create predation and insecurity and there are
non-state forms of governance that can provide
better than they do for safety and economic
development. The DRC, Sierra Leone and
Somalia all have been subjected to extreme
predation by the state at certain periods in the
last quarter of a century and many parts of
Somalia demonstrate alternative forms of
governance today (Kamara 2010; Leonard and
Samantar 2011; Little 2003; Menkhaus 2006;
Prunier 2009). 
Second, states do need legitimacy if they are to
succeed. The Zaire phase of Congo’s history
illustrates the point well – without a normative
underpinning, the need for coercive or material
inducements for compliance spiralled upward until
the resources to provide them were exhausted
(Etzioni 1964). Zaire probably was no more
corrupt than a number of other states that have
survived but, unlike them, in its last 20 years it
was seriously deficient in its normative claim on
the obedience of its citizens (Young and Turner
1985). As a result, it collapsed when challenged
in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide.
The ‘social contract’ is a thought experiment,
whereby we ask when people would agree to cede
authority (i.e. the obligation to obey) to a
governing body in return for the social order and
other benefits it might provide. The classic social
contract theorists (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
Kant) did not posit that such an agreement was
an historical act; for them it was simply a
philosophical device. Nonetheless, their thought
is based on clear assumptions about how humans
behave, on what would lead them to consider
authority legitimate, and thus on the principles
from which a stable political order would need to
be (re)constructed.4 Most important for our
purposes they assumed that the state was based
on a single ‘social contract’, which in principle
could have been consummated between relatively
equal, individual citizens. In this Overview we
will show that security in the contemporary
African state is actually founded on two
contracts5 and two bargains, in which the key
actors are unequal groups rather than
autonomous individuals.6 Contracts and bargains
both are based in exchange, but contracts come
to be valued for their own sake and thus create
stable obligations, whereas bargains exist only so
long as they produce immediate benefits for all
parties.
3 The community contract
The fundamental social contracts in Africa are
not between the state and individuals alone but
by individuals with their communities and by
communities with the state. Of course the
African state in its contemporary configuration,
save for Ethiopia, was a colonial creation and
thus came into existence through external force.
The colonial state could not be efficiently
maintained on coercion alone, however, even
with superior military technology; some
normative compliance was needed as well.
(Significant material inducements were not even
considered.) An implicit contract therefore was
struck between local ‘traditional’ leaders (either
existing or newly created) whereby they would
lead their communities in complying with the
writ of the state and the colonial power would
protect these authorities from any local
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challenges (Oliver and Fage 1966). In this way a
necessary modicum of ‘traditional’ legitimacy
was captured in support of a ‘legal-rational’
state, to use Max Weber’s terms (Weber 1947).
In most of Africa this community sanction
continues to underwrite the authority of the
state at the local level outside the major towns,
even where ‘traditional’ rulers have been
supplanted by appointive or democratic systems
of governance. Mahmood Mamdani argues that
this colonial legacy divides African populations
between rural subjects and urban citizens
(Mamdani 1996). In Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and
Sierra Leone it is clear that many town dwellers
and most elites do feel a powerful, unmediated
commitment to their contemporary states, which
has given these countries territorial resilience
(and which was surprising to many external
observers of the DRC in the Congo Wars). And
legally Africans today are bound to their states as
individuals. Nonetheless, the informal reality of
the community contract and its mediated
relationship with the state remains, for non-elite
urban Africans are still subject to the authority
of their rural communities of origin if they wish
to retain land rights there (as most do). 
The point then is that the social contract with
the state is a mediated one for most Africans in
most countries. They owe allegiance to their
community and the community has a contract with
the state. Today the latter contract continues to
provide support for the community’s governance
structure and usually would involve its physical
security, roads, and access to education and
modern health care as well. In post-conflict
situations the ‘terms of exchange’ for the contract
will have slipped, however, so that just physical
security is enough to assure the allegiance of the
community’s governance structure.
The nature of the community social contract is
quite important as well. As Mark Button
suggests, social contracts are not self-enforcing.
They require supporting cultural values and
institutions, which will be built in interaction
with the contract itself (Button 2008). Thus the
local contract has implications far beyond the
community itself and powerfully shapes the
discourse in the national political system as well.
Authority at the local level is closely linked to
control of land. In most of Africa peasants work
their own land, but they do not have individually
transferable ownership of it. Instead they have
use rights (usufruct in Latin) but only as long as
they occupy and till it (la mit en valeur in French).
The right to dispose of unoccupied land belongs
to the state and the local authority (usually a
chief). The local social contract as we observe it
in conflict and post-conflict countries depends
very little on the delivery of ‘development’
services but instead relies on the perception of
local citizens as to whether they are being
provided with justice, which means both
(a) access to land for the purposes of production,
and (b) local order that is balanced and not
unduly oppressive, especially that judicial fines
are in line with local income possibilities.7
The traditional authority-holder at the base
typically is not representative of the whole
community but is the leader of what is
considered the ‘founding family’ (usually
through clearing the bush, sometimes by
conquest). The ‘strangers’ who come after the
founding family are given permission by its
representative to use the land – which creates
value and adds to the strength of the community
– in return for which the ‘stranger’ and his
descendants are to give tribute and obedience to
the scion of the founding family (the chief). So
even if the founding social contract might
originally have been between a group of relative
equals, over time it becomes one between the
founding families and the followers (settlers by
petition, conquest or slavery).
There are places in Africa where traditional
authorities no longer exercise local authority and
therefore the occupant is not necessarily from a
‘founding family’. In Kenya and eastern Nigeria
chiefs were a colonial creation. But in both
countries the administrative chiefs conform in
other respects to the analysis we provide here. In
Tanzania party secretaries replaced chiefs at
independence and the determined egalitarianism
of its socialist period seems to have spared it
from autochthon (‘sons of the soil’) challenges.
In effect they have replaced the chiefs as local
authorities. The socialist government of newly
independent Mozambique attempted to follow
the Tanzanian model of party secretaries but this
threat to the still highly legitimate authority of
traditional chiefs was one of the causes of the
civil war there (Manning 1997).
One of the tensions underlying the local social
contract in most of rural Africa is that the land
Leonard Social Contracts, Networks and Security in Tropical Africa Conflict States: An Overview4
frontier is now largely closed, so that in many
places these immigrant families have come to be
seen as competitors, not as contributors to the
welfare of the founders. There are two types of
this conflict – the first, where the settlers have
blended into the original community culturally
but still retain a subordinate place; the second,
where they retain their cultural distinctness, in
which case the conflict takes the form of
autochthony (a clash over who has the right of
priority because of original settlement – the
‘sons of the soil’). The second sometimes arises
from state intervention to grant group’s or
individual’s land rights in areas where locals
regard them as outsiders. Parts of Sierra Leone
illustrate the first type of conflict, as the sons of
subordinate families now have difficulty getting
farms on which they can grow permanent crops
(without which they also can’t support their
wives) and this led them to provide early support
for the civil war there (Jackson 2006; Richards
1998). Congo’s South Kivu (Vlassenroot 2002)
and western Côte d’Ivoire (Boone 2009; Allouche
and Zadi Zadi, this IDS Bulletin) illustrate the
variant of the second type where there has been
initial local consent, while North Kivu and
Kenya’s central Rift Valley are examples of
earlier state interventions. Both of the latter two
variants have fuelled virulent xenophobic
appeals to the ‘true’ locals (i.e. the descendants
of the first settlers). In western Côte d’Ivoire the
perception of young ‘sons of the soil’ is that
chiefs failed to protect adequately their rights to
land in their communities, which undermined
traditional authority. The consequence was that
in this situation the chiefs were less able to
contain inter-ethnic conflict in the rural areas of
the west than the central state officials in the
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Illustrative vignettes of community governance
Southern Sierra Leone
The many paramount chiefs are elected for life by representatives of local taxpayers.
All resident adults are eligible to serve as electors but only descendants of the founding
family are eligible for selection. The paramount chief in Shenge is an elderly woman who
had a distinguished career in education. But to be elected she had her elected brother
deposed by the courts on the grounds that he had been only adopted into the founding
family (Vincent 2012).
Eastern Congo
Rwandaphone pastoralists were present in the Congo’s South Kivu Province by the late
nineteenth century, before Belgian colonial occupation. Local acceptance of their being
there was based on their providing tribute to the Bami (kings) of the already present
Babembe, Bavira and Bafulero, payment of which was abrogated in the 1920s. The right to
determine who is ‘present’ on their land remains an important symbolic issue for the
‘autochthonous’ groups as it relates to the (Rwandaphone) Banyamulenge and has been a
subject of occasional violent conflict since the Mulele uprising of the 1960s (Vlassenroot
2002). Babembe land, for example, is not scarce, but the Banyamulenge are pastoralists
and come from the high plateau into the former’s cultivated fields in the June–September
dry season. A fee for this presence has now been negotiated by a political officer from the
UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO, and the problem therefore should be solved. But the
Babembe elite continue to want the Banyamulenge to acknowledge symbolically that the
land belongs to the Babembe, just as it is important to the Banyamulenge that they be
recognised as having become genuine indigines through the state’s granting their territory
a separate administrative status (Mushi 2012). 
Somalia
For Somalis the primary provider of personal security is the diya-paying group, which
comprises about 100 adult males and which negotiates compensation (or exacts revenge)
for torts committed on or by outsiders. Islamic courts supplement this tit-for-tat justice and
are especially important for business contracts. Thus even in Somaliland and Puntland
most justice is delivered by non-governmental institutions, giving both clan and Islam
centrality to Somali systems of legitimate governance (Leonard and Samantar 2011).
nearby towns. Here, then, we see the importance
of the community-level social contract because it
had been weakened. In Somalia the concepts of
descent and clanship by adoption are present but
ownership is recognised as fluid and subject to
conflict, negotiation and contract – which in
some ways is less subject to larger-scale violent
conflict than the other two.
The cultural and institutional patterns created by
the rural social contract are carried over into the
cities as well. In urban Bukavu and Uvira (South
Kivu), in the absence of strong policing and with
simmering rural conflict, we observed that
insecure ethnic groups have tended to consolidate
in exclusive neighbourhoods. During periods of
conflict, groups also organise their own collective
night-watch security. Mutualités have developed
for all the significant groups in the multi-ethnic
towns. These have elected officers (and thus
break with the traditional administration practice
of appointment by descent). Intra-communal
disputes are judged by committees of the ‘wise’
(sages) and inter-communal ones are negotiated
by the officers between mutualités. Those who
refuse to be bound by their community’s decisions
will be ostracised by it, thereby losing its
protection and influence, which can be very
dangerous for the lone individual. The pattern
that has evolved of kinship-based protection,
collective decision-making in a more consensual
mode, and intergroup negotiation is very similar
to the diya-paying8 group and clan governance
processes that have survived or been revived in
Somalia (Leonard and Samantar 2011).
The more difficult conflicts in Africa become
rooted in disputes over these intra-local contracts.
The inter-area conflicts, which are played out on
the national stage, are more easily managed by
negotiation and division of ‘spoils’. (Examples of
both types of conflict and the differences in
handling them are evident in Kenya and Nigeria.)
Note that these intra-local conflicts rarely
threaten state boundaries, as that is not the level
at which the intense conflicts lie. Severine
Autesserre stresses peacekeepers in conflict
states need to address conflicts at this local level,
as they sustain the larger, more internationally
visible ones that are directly implicated in state
breakdown (Autesserre 2007, 2010). 
The local social contract remains hugely
important even when its terms are being
somewhat renegotiated. In eastern Congo,
Mozambique and Sierra Leone many chiefs were
killed during their civil wars and most of the
more senior ones fled the rural areas. Some of
these chiefs (more so the Bami in Kivu, Congo
than their equivalent paramount chiefs in Sierra
Leone) have not returned to their rural
residences after the war, which has weakened
their legitimacy. Customary tribunals also are
not as active in Congo and Sierra Leone as they
were before the war. The fact that the customary
tribunal judges depend on fees and fines for their
income increasingly has led to their being seen
as corrupt – or at least biased.9 Alternative, non-
governmental dispute resolution services,
sometimes tied to the enforcement potential of
the magistrates’ courts, are becoming more
prominent.10 Thus the chiefs are less relevant in
adjudication now and their legitimacy is
somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, it is striking
that in Congo and Sierra Leone the role of
traditional chief was quickly re-established after
the wars and its fundamental legitimacy is not
challenged at any level. In Mozambique, where
the government had wanted to displace the
chiefs, one of the rationales for ‘bringing them
back’ was to help re-establish order and it was
strongly supported by women’s groups
(paradoxically as ‘tradition’ is patriarchial, but it
makes sense because they are the first victims, at
home and outside of the home). Chiefs continue
to control land allocation and only rarely have
men who led self-defence militias during the
wars been able to challenge their leadership
more generally. (In Mozambique, rebel
RENAMO11 has been able to gain a role in
parliament, but with the support of the chiefs
with which they were most closely allied during
the civil war.) The social system of the Somalis is
non-hierarchical and the title of ‘elder’ is enjoyed
by all adult men in a clan diya-paying group. The
continued civil wars have made the diya-paying
groups less egalitarian, as the patronage of
wealthy businessmen and the militia leaders they
support has intruded. But the diya-paying groups
themselves have become fundamental again to
the security of almost all Somalis. So in all four
countries the operation of the local social contract
is being renegotiated but not its existence. 
In all four countries we see traditional
authorities renegotiating their role by also
participating in the competition for control of
the modern state. In the former Somalia,
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traditional structures of governance and their
leading elders have been involved in negotiating
successor polities. Their role was particularly
central in Somaliland and these elders were
appointed to an upper house of its legislature.
Similarly, in Puntland these traditional
structures continue to select all members of the
legislature. On the other hand many elders were
perceived as having been bought in the
establishment of the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia and were discredited as
a result (Leonard and Samantar 2011). The
neglect of traditional governance structures in
the centre and south of Somalia seems to be a
major factor in the failure to re-establish order
there and in the growth in competition from
political Islamists (Leonard and Samantar, this
IDS Bulletin).
In Sierra Leone democratically elected district
councils were recreated after the civil war,
probably with the intention of diminishing the
authority of the chiefs, whose failing in some
regions were seen as having contributed to the
conflict. A change in national government has
led to increased influence for the chiefs, however,
and election to district councils and the national
parliament is strongly influenced by the
endorsements of chiefs. 
In South Kivu (DRC), although the power of
traditional chiefs is still respected, there are a
number of new leaders who are developing new
venues of power attached to positions within a
larger polity and this has brought many traditional
chiefs to reconsider their role and to use it in
order to provide new venues for themselves, their
offspring or closely related family members.
Chiefs seeking to reposition themselves by
capitalising on their traditional authority either
can compete directly with these new leaders for
elective or appointive positions in the provincial
or national legislatures, or they can strike
bargains to influence the votes of their subjects.
It is hard (even if not impossible) for someone to
be elected without the backing of his/her
communal base, which is heavily influenced by
verbal signals from the traditional chiefs. 
In all four countries (as generally in Africa)
elected representatives are seen as the
ambassadors of their communities (Leonard
2009). No matter whether the local authorities
are ‘kingmakers’ or clients and whether their
position is traditional, appointive or democratic,
they powerfully mediate the relationship
between average citizens and the state,
preserving key aspects of the traditional two-
stage social contract. 
Mahmood Mamdani in Citizen and Subject
(Mamdani 1996) implies that we should be
moving away from these local social contracts and
embracing (the French Revolution) concept of
national citizenship. We are inclined to think this
is ahistorical, since local-level social contracts
persisted everywhere in the world, including the
early industrialising world, until at least 1800. It
is true that most Africans today see themselves as
having an allegiance to their state (even if not
always its regime) but this is in addition to their
local allegiance and is still most often mediated
operationally through the local social contract. The
challenge therefore is not to end local social
contracts but instead to make local governance
more responsive and effective without
challenging the deep residual legitimacy the
traditional authorities have in most localities. At
least in post-conflict situations, elected local
governments and appointed magistrates’ courts
may be appropriate but they cannot replace the
chiefs. The former two can be as corrupt as the
latter and elected representatives rely too heavily
on chiefs to mobilise electoral support. 
Reform of traditional administration, not its
displacement, is probably in order in post-conflict
situations. Three related possibilities occur to us.
First, all local adults might be permitted to elect
their chiefs from among the many descendants of
the ruling lineage. (This is the Sierra Leone
practice, unlike that of Congo where the
successor is the child effectively designated by the
preceding chief and confirmed by the provincial
government. The Somalis do not have chiefs. In
Mozambique tradition and party still contend for
local leadership in a hybrid system, though the
former is now accepted by the government.)
Second, chiefs might be asked to renew their
mandate every, say, ten years by standing for
re-election. (Sierra Leone chiefs serve for life.
Congolese chiefs can be removed by the state for
malfeasance, but of course this is not a renewal of
a local mandate.) Both of these practices would
make traditional administration more
accountable to those it serves (and therefore less
likely to be exploitative) and would help to weed
out those who have become old or have proved
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incompetent. Third, the practice of chiefs and
customary judges deriving their incomes from the
fees and fines they charge for their decisions
needs to change.12 This practice exacerbates the
already prevalent problem of corruption and
enhances the perception that local governance is
biased. To achieve this, however, government
revenues need to be separated from the incomes
of governing personnel – one of the classic steps
toward modern bureaucracy that Weber
chronicled (Weber 1967). Fourth, throughout
Africa, wherever land is becoming scarce, the
arbitrariness with which chiefs often allocate it
weakens the effectiveness of this critical link in
local governance, particularly with young men.
But in conflict situations (from strong states like
Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya through to the weaker
ones of Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia) central
management of the closing land frontier has
often been worse and thus is a challenge to
governance at all levels. 
In practice, Somalia has already adopted the first
two points, as leadership of the diya-paying group
is not hierarchical and most Islamic Sharia court
judges are not hereditary. Nor are Sharia courts
seen as being as corrupt as other government
offices. Thus non-state governance has been
resilient in Somalia and movements based on
Sharia have special appeal there (Leonard and
Samantar, this IDS Bulletin and 2011). 
4 The military bargain
The effective agreement between an African
country’s military and its governing regime (and
hence the state) is the most problematic and
unstable of the four pacts underlying state
security. Coups have been notoriously common in
independent sub-Saharan Africa. Civilian leaders
have found it hard to create bonds of legitimacy
with militaries; the result has been not social
contracts but bargains of temporary convenience.
Even before the rise of the modern state in
Europe the identity of military officers there was
separate from that of villagers and was closely
tied to that of superordinate political authorities.
Thus European states and proto-states enjoyed a
residual legitimacy from their militaries,
particularly in the face of peasant uprisings. The
loyalty of the majority of African militaries to
their presidents is more likely to be ethnic and
based on immediate material advantage. Of
course there are exceptions: the presidents of
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda came to power at
the head of rebel armies. In Tanzania President
Nyerere instituted universal six-month military
service, so that career officers command only
conscripts (who are driven by civilian concepts of
loyalty to the state). The Kenyan military seems
to have concluded from its participation in
United Nations peacekeeping missions that
military interventions in politics are always
disastrous; and the Nigerian army developed an
identity with the state through defence of its
unity in the country’s painful civil war and is
kept in check now by the widespread view that
military rule was a failure. 
In the DRC, Sierra Leone and Somalia, however,
the civil wars were prompted at least in part by
military predation and incompetence. In all
three, the government was unable to pay either
the army or the police an adequate salary and
they proceeded to live off the communities where
they were posted – which made them militarily
ineffective as well. It is an error to see the
military in a failing state as an instrument for
the provision of security to citizens. In fact in
conditions of instability in Africa, army and
police instead tend to be predatory – in which
case it may or may not be possible for local
authorities to make a purely local supplementary
contract with them. 
In Congo it is quite explicit in the constitution
and law that even the police are concerned with
the security of the state, not the population
(Nlandu 2012). In eastern Congo the situation is
even more extreme. What began as a Rwandan
invasion to root out the Rwandan Hutu forces
that carried out the genocide and threatened the
country from nearby refugee camps in the DRC
evolved into an occupation of North and South
Kivu by a Rwandaphone, even if nominally
Congolese, national army. This is not the place to
describe the complicated process by which this
took place. But Congolese Hutu came to be
combined with the Tutsi in the part of the newly
integrated Congo army stationed in North and
South Kivu and the two turned their attention
from the Hutu genocidaires to the local Maï Maï
rebels who have consistently resisted the
Rwandan invasion. The presence of this army
thus exacerbated rather than solved the local
security problem and served to delegitimate the
national government and UN peacekeeping
forces (MONUSCO), which are seen locally as
having condoned this development (Mushi 2012).
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The fiction that this Rwandaphone army was
serving the Congo has now disintegrated and the
former has returned to the status of a militia and
is now fighting both the Congolese army
(FARDC – Forces Armées de la RDC [Armed
Forces of the DRC]) and MONUSCO.
The more general issue is the relationship that
the army and police have with the populations in
the areas they ‘serve’. These aspirants to a
‘monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence’
(to use another concept from Weber) in failing
states actually are rarely paid properly or on time
and thus must derive their incomes from local
resources if they and their families are to survive.
In the worst instances they simply plunder the
locals without limit. In Sierra Leone people
consistently spoke disparagingly of the predation
of the ‘sobels’, soldiers who had joined the rebels
against the government. In Kivu local chiefs
optimally negotiate an agreement with the army
and police that the community will provision them
as long as they don’t otherwise impose on the
people. In between are soldiers and police who
don’t murder or rape locals and take only what
they really need. (Congolese informants speak of
the latter type of predation as ‘well disciplined’.)
We found several instances in Kivu where ‘living
off the land’ created severe local tensions and
petitions from communities that the army be
removed from their areas (because they found it a
source of insecurity, not protection). The chiefs
who negotiated local provisioning essentially have
adopted an ancient practice – as paying armies
(rather than having them live off enemy land) is
no more than a century and a half old anywhere in
the world. One of the American grievances in its
revolutionary war was the British practice of
‘quartering’ individual soldiers abroad on specific
families/households, who then were responsible
for their room and board. Similarly, Napoleon
expected his armies to ‘live off the land’ in the
countries he conquered.
Such ‘quartering’ is an unsatisfactory practice,
however, as it was for Napoleon in Spain and for
the British in the American colonies. Proper
provisioning through the national budget is
much to be preferred. This can be expensive,
however, particularly in the aftermath of a civil
war. In Somaliland approximately 70 per cent of
the government budget goes to its army, which is
the remnant of the forces that won the country’s
independence in 1991.
Provisioning and reorienting the military and
police has been easier in Sierra Leone, as the
original army was completely decommissioned
after it joined the rebels and its replacement was
trained and financed by the British. Similarly the
police in Sierra Leone were reformed with British
help to orient them to the protection rather than
control of the population (Charley and M’Cormack
2011). But even when the police and army cease
being predators, the major instrument of local
order (including in Mozambique) is through
communal authority. National police and army
can keep others from predating, which does
improve local security but only by stabilising the
predation. They are too sparse on the ground to
create full security against local crime. A major
issue troubling both the DRC and Sierra Leone
is that the ‘customary police’ of the traditional
local authorities are not being financed any
longer and therefore are not effective. 
5 The international bargain
In practice, weak sub-Saharan African countries
experience a fourth agreement with the state as
well, one that generally is essential to the other
three but is destabilising to them as well. Poor
countries lack sufficient domestic finances for the
roads, health and education that their
communities expect in their social contract with
the state and their governments also will strain to
pay the salaries of their civil and military services
without international development assistance.
Many failed states in Africa have been infected as
well with conflicts from their neighbours and
need regional and ‘Northern’ assistance with
their attempts to find peace. These forms of aid
in effect are bargains and come at a price.
First, the various donors have their own agendas.
Some are very much driven by their own domestic
interests, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and
the USA in Somalia and Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda in eastern Congo. Others are more
selfless, such as the UK and Nigeria in Sierra
Leone or the UN in all three. Even the benign
agendas may be discordant with local priorities,
however. For example, the desire of Western
powers to support the reconstruction of post-
genocide Rwanda is in tension with their desire to
bring peace to eastern Congo, where Rwandan
activities are a core part of the problem.
Thus, second, international military and budget
support is likely to have a shorter time horizon
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than the ten years most observers have
concluded is necessary for reconstruction
(Collier 2007, 2009). And the countries that
prove willing to commit troops may have a
counterproductive effect, as did Ethiopia in
Somalia and Rwanda in Congo.
Third, international efforts at peacekeeping and
state reconstruction are focused on national
institutions and conflicts. The internationals
tend to have a very weak ability to understand
and support the resolution of purely local
conflicts (which may actually be sustaining the
larger ones) or to buttress the reconstruction of
effective local governance, as is evident in both
eastern Congo and Somalia (Autesserre 2007,
2010; Leonard and Samantar, this IDS Bulletin
and 2011; Menkhaus 2006). Relatedly, the rules
of engagement for UN peacekeeping forces limit
contact with local communities to a few officers
and reduce tours of duty to six months,
effectively preventing understanding of local
realities. Similarly the expatriates who lead
donor organisations and control their purse
strings rarely stay in-post for more than a few
years, so that they too generally don’t
understand the subtleties of national, much less
local, structures of governance.
Fourth, internationals conceive of rights in terms
of individuals rather than collectivities. Thus
their interventions have a poor ‘fit’. The impact
can be positive. Women in Sierra Leone are much
better off since the war. They paid a terrible
price of rape during the war itself, but the post-
war reconstruction efforts unleashed a huge
amount of female consciousness-raising by
NGOs (both local and international) and by the
British with the police. The result is that women
(at least in the south and east) are much more
conscious of their rights today, they are much
less willing to accept abuse from their husbands,
they are more aggressive about protecting their
rights in court and supporting other women in
doing so, and the traditional authorities feel
(some reluctantly) that they must respect and
enforce these new rights. The same efforts are
under way in Congo.
None of this is to say that international
involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations
is unnecessary or generally counterproductive.
The huge imbalance between domestic and
international military and financial capabilities,
however, gives unusual weight to the
internationals. But their imperfect understanding
of the national context makes their power
clumsy and draws attention away from the local
levels to which much more attention must be
given if the human security of the populations is
to be recreated.
6 Networks
The prominence of international actors in the
sustenance and functioning of post-conflict states
raises the question of whether they threaten the
integrity of the African state itself. There is no
doubt that governance becomes more horizontal
and the actors involved are more numerous and
financially consequential in a post-conflict
situation. International actors also change the
policies countries pursue and indirectly make
their politics more open. We conclude, however,
that they do not threaten the integrity of the
state itself.
International donors tend to network with one
another around subject matters of common
interest. Nonetheless their differing visions and
competing interests do create space within which
the recipient national government is most often
able to influence if not determine an outcome –
as long as it cares deeply about it and is
relatively united itself. Even in the case of
Somalia the donors have not been able to
coordinate their activities and priorities
effectively, despite trying to do so, being located
together outside the country in Nairobi, and
facing a very weak Somali government (see
Schmidt, this IDS Bulletin). 
During the period of conflict, the work of
humanitarian international NGOs (INGOs) will
be coordinated by UNOCHA (UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance), so as
to assure fairly good geographic and functional
coverage. Local communities and local NGOs
come to understand this function of UNOCHA
and know to go there to press their needs and
the initiatives they would like to undertake.
Humanitarian INGOs themselves do not prioritise
community relationships, however. They are
there to ‘bind up the wounded, feed the starving
and shelter the homeless’. Once the crisis of the
immediate conflict is gone, they will leave with
little or no notice. It is the development INGOs
which are there for the long term.
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The development INGOs tend overwhelmingly to
operate from strict programmatic priorities,
however. National NGOs come to understand
these priorities and structure their own
programmes accordingly so as to access funding.
But then this means that the NGOs also are
driven programmatically and are internationally
responsive. Communities find it very difficult to
identify and understand donor and INGO
priorities. Thus we found that in the aftermath
of conflict, communities lack networked
relationships with all but a few international
donors. Even with local NGOs, it is the NGOs
that are taking the initiative to establish
priorities (as dictated by the international
donors financing them).
The major exception to the foregoing
generalisation about development INGOs and
NGOs are the churches, which are embedded in
the communities, have an interest in being
responsive to local priorities, often already have
a long-established service infrastructure in the
communities, and are supported by their own
INGOs.13
With the exception of the comparatively modest
assistance received from or through the churches,
communities rely on their elected representatives
(sometimes through the local council) to identify
potential donors to meet local priorities. These
elected positions are held by people with elite
backgrounds (by local standards) who are able to
negotiate the complexities of the world of donor
priorities and bureaucratic procedures. Thus
even very substantial overseas development
assistance (ODA) flows reinforce rather than
undermine the centrality of government in the
delivery of services to the citizens. In fact, even
in relatively strong African states international
donors frequently finance civil servants to deliver
services and programmes (Brass 2012). The
programmatic content and structure of
development programmes are heavily influenced
by donor priorities, philosophies and procedures
(Johnson 2009) but most often communities
experience the services as being provided by the
state and they therefore reinforce, rather than
undermine, the social contract between the central
state and local communities (Brass 2010, 2012). 
Of course where local NGOs rather than civil
servants mediate the international provision of
resources for local services, their leaders may
come to compete with government-based elites
for local political leadership. So the precise
network through which services reach the
community will have political and other
consequences, even if not for the legitimacy of
the state itself. But this is not new, for it was
presaged in the colonial period by the
competition that schoolteachers gave to chiefs
and other traditional authorities (Ita 1972).
Most of these donor-financed NGO leaders have
delimited spheres of influence, so that it matters
in local politics or in narrow policy domains who
they are but not in broader national politics.
Again, the major exception here is the churches,
which most often do have the national
organisations through which to build on their
resurrected role as key service providers. 
7 Conclusions
The classical concept of the social contract leads
us astray in our attempts to provide human
security in conflict-ridden countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. It causes us to think of bonds of
legitimacy between the state and a citizenry of
individuals. Instead the foundational social
contracts in Africa are between families and
their local authorities and between communities
and the larger state. Complicating these two
contracts are implicit bargains the state has with
its military and with the international community.
In addition, the focus of the classical social
contract on individuals leads to a liberal set of
values that steer us away from the core issues
needing attention in African conflicts – the
central role that contested community and
individual land rights have in the local social
contract, the relationship that communities
(rather than individuals) have with the state, and
the impact that the unstable loyalties of
underfunded militaries have directly and
indirectly on community security. Montesquieu’s
‘liberty’ and the checks and balance offered by a
focus on groups offers a more promising path in
state reconstruction (see Leonard, this IDS
Bulletin, last article). 
Post-conflict systems of governance in Africa
have become much more multilevelled and
networked than they were in the era
immediately following independence. Local
systems of governance and the resolution of their
problems are key to the restoration of order.
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Furthermore, the severe resource constraints
created by violent conflict make international
actors central to the imposition of some
semblance of peace – a reality that also makes
international actors prominent in the networks
that provide resources for reconstruction and
development throughout the multiple levels of a
country’s governance system. The presence of
internationals in these networks does mean that
a country’s president does not have the ability to
set priorities and control the distribution of
resources in the way s/he did in the first two
decades of independence. As a result it is
possible for local leaders, professionals, national
NGOs and churches to challenge the president
over matters of policy and politics in ways that they
could not in the early independence era. But we
find that these new or revitalised networks do
not challenge the state as an institution itself.
Ultimately the key links in these networks are
being provided by individuals and organisations
that are embedded in the state and will not
challenge its existence, unity or effectiveness.
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Notes
1 Our project also undertook research on these
issues in Mozambique, under the direction of
Peter Houtzager and Carlos Cuinhane.
Unfortunately that work was not quite
complete as we went to press but where
possible we have drawn on the interim results.
2 For examples of such Hobbesian analysis, see
(Beichman 2008; Winter 2004). 
3 The terms used to describe countries hovering
on the borders of violent internal conflict are
unstable and contested internationally. Some
members of the international community
establish a distinction between a fragile state,
a crisis state and a failed state. Moving from
less to more seriously challenged countries,
fragile states are vulnerable to internal and
external shocks, and domestic and
international conflicts. A crisis state is
characterised by acute stress and the inability
of its governing institutions to manage
conflict and shocks. The state is threatened by
collapse, war and ultimately the formation of
a different state, if no actor succeeds in
imposing a new ruling order over the territory.
The idea of a failed state is more extreme. It
is a condition of state collapse in which the
state can no longer perform its basic security
functions and has no control over its territory
and borders. It can no longer reproduce the
conditions of its own existence.
4 A fuller consideration of the limits of the
classical Western conception of the social
contract when applied to African conflict states
is found in Leonard and Samantar (2011).
5 Of course if we were to consider the functions
of the state beyond security, the number of
contracts might be extended almost to
infinity, depending on our level of analysis.
The classic work of Barnard (1968 [1938]) as
extended by March and Simon (1958) sees all
work in and for organisations as based on a
quasi-contractual balance of inducements and
contributions.
6 Rousseau gives more credence to people as
social creatures whereas Hobbes’ analysis is
narrowly individualist (O’Hagen 1999; Tuck
1989; Wokler 2001). However, even Rousseau
does not give the importance to community
that is necessary in Africa. Ibn Khaldun, the
fourteenth century Arab philosopher, comes
closest (Issawi 1987). 
7 Traditional authorities in late colonial and well-
functioning independent states generally have
been quite active on development matters and
surely this is an important part of their social
contract with their communities. But in
conditions of conflict the terms of exchange in
the local social contract seem to have reverted
to these more basic aspects of governance.
8 Diya groups are made up of about 100 adult
males in a sub-lineage who exact and pay
compensation for torts committed against and
by group members (Lewis 1999 [1961]). Such
use of ascriptive ties for security and advantage
seems common when civil war forces a
breakdown in formal governance structures.
9 Related evidence for Mozambique is found in
Kyed (2009a and b) and Workman (2011).
10 A similar development in Ghana is reported
by Crook et al. (2010).
11 Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência
Nacional Moçambicana).
12 In the DRC fees collected for judgements
belong to a decentralised entity (the chefferie or
collectivité). The Mwami, as the head of the
collectivity, is supposed to receive a wage. Of
course the management of fees and taxes
collected by the collectivity is patrimonial since
the Mwami effectively controls how its revenues
are spent and these are used to pay his salary.
When the Mwami has no more land to sell or
other personal resources and when he no
longer receives gifts from his prominent
subjects, he may end up living like a commoner
if the court revenues are compromised.
13 For example, for the centrality of churches in
Congelese education, see De Herdt (2011).
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